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INTRODUCTION
The extent to which a judge should defer to an executive offi-
cial's claim of state secrets privilege is one of the law's "open areas,"'
meaning neither text nor precedent fully dictates the judge's course
of action.2 The problem of the open area is particularly significant
where national security and civil liberties intersect.3 In such cases,
judges act on presumptions, such as the presumption ofjudicial defer-
ence on matters of national security.4
The rationale for deferring to executive claims of state secrets
privilege is itself based on two presumptions. The first presumption is
that the executive branch is in a better position than the judiciary to
assess national security-related risks to public safety.5 The second
presumption is that when the executive branch invokes the privilege,
it does so solely with the public's interest in mind. 6 If, however, either
of these presumptions turns out to be incorrect, or less correct than
the judge had presumed, the deference that the judge had granted
would be without a rational basis.
Consider the following three situations. In Situation A, you are at
a flea market and are interested in purchasing an antique bookcase.
Other than your knowledge that such bookcases are fashionable, you
know nothing about them. The owner of the flea market is an expert
antique dealer. Each vendor pays the owner a flat fee; payment is not
dependent on what the vendor eventually sells. The owner has per-
sonally priced every item worth over $100 to ensure that the flea mar-
ket maintains its good reputation. You see a bookcase priced at $750.
1 Judge Richard A. Posner coined the concept of a legal "open area" in The Role of the
Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1049, 1054 (2006).
2 The Supreme Court has, of course, provided judges with some guidance. That
guidance, however, is one fifty-five-year-old opinion with little coherence and only a shaky
foundation in American jurisprudence. See William G. Weaver & Danielle Escontrias, Ori-
gins of the State Secrets Privilege, 43, 46-47, 58, 65-66 (2008) available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1079364 (arguing that history provides little support for great judicial deference
in state secrets privilege cases). As Weaver summarized: "It is difficult to conclude other
than that courts have simply abandoned the field of a contentious area of law .... Id. at
65-66.
3 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties v. National Security in the Law's Open Areas, 86
B.U. L. REv. 1315, 1315 (2006).
4 See id. at 1316.
5 See id. ("[I]ndividual judges have relatively little first-hand experience" with cases
implicating national security matters because these cases "arise infrequently." Further-
more, 'Judges are relative novices when it comes to assessing the possible implications of
their decisions for national security.").
6 See id. at 1327-28 (finding it necessary that "those making the critical judgments
are properly taking the relevant factors into account in a fair and reasonable manner").
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In Situation B, assume the same facts as in Situation A, except that
in Situation B, the owner of the flea market is not an expert antique
dealer. Situation C is identical to Situation B except that in Situation C,
the owner makes a significant commission on each item sold.
Does your confidence in the accuracy of the bookcase's price vary
from Situation A to Situation C? If so, why? In Situation A, you might
defer to the owner's expert judgment. In Situation B, although the
owner is no more of an expert than you are, you might believe that
another's honest evaluation of the bookcase's value is worthy of some
respect. In Situation C, however, the owner not only lacks expertise
but also has an ulterior motive. Might the prospect of making a com-
mission on the bookcase have influenced the owner's evaluation of
the bookcase's value?
Although one's consumer instincts take these differences into ac-
count, the state secrets privilege does not. The state secrets privilege,
which traces its modern origins to the 1953 case of United States v.
Reynolds,7 permits the head of an executive department to withhold
from a court information that would jeopardize national security if
disclosed.8 The government's use of the privilege in several recent,
high-profile, and controversial cases9 has renewed scholarly and pub-
lic attention to the privilege. On October 9, 2007, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Khaled el-Masri's petition for writ of certiorari. 10 El-
Masri alleges that the CIA oversaw his confinement and torture in an
Afghan prison."' After el-Masri brought suit in the Eastern District of
Virginia, the government interceded, asserted the state secrets privi-
lege, and successfully had the case dismissed.1 2 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal.1 3 In el-Masri's case, although
the government's expertise arguably places it in a position similar to
7 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
8 See id. at 10. For examples of what constitutes an undermining of national security,
see infra notes 127-29.
9 See, e.g., el-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 373 (2007) (holding that the state secrets privilege barred plantiffs' discovery requests
in an extraordinary rendition case); A-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d
1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (exploring the state secrets privilege in the warrantless wiretapping
context); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the state
secrets privilege forecloses a remedy in an extraordinary rendition context); ACLU v. NSA,
467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006) (granting government's motion for stay pending appeal from
district court decision enjoining government from using the Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that the state
secrets privilege barred plaintiffs' discovery of whether AT&T provided records to NSA);
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (exploring the state secrets
privilege in the warrantless surveillance context).
10 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).
11 See el-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300.
12 Id. at 299, 301-02.
13 Id. at 313.
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the flea market owner in Situation A, to some observers,' 4 its interest
in avoiding accountability for its extraordinary rendition policy places
it in the conflicted position of the owner in Situation C.
Commentators have nearly universally criticized the state secrets
privilege, 15 suggesting a range of alternatives, including abolishing the
privilege altogether; 16 making it a qualified rather than absolute privi-
lege; 17 using special masters' 8 or special tribunals to adjudicate cases
involving sensitive information;' 9 and enlisting Congress to legislate
an alternative. 2 1 Many commentators have criticized the courts for
being overly deferential to the government's claims of privilege. 21
This Note does not directly engage these arguments. Rather, it
assumes that the state secrets privilege is desirable and addresses the
conditions under which the privilege should apply (the trigger test),
as well as, in relative terms only, the extent to which a judge should
review privilege claims (margin of scrutiny deference). The trigger
test draws from the "reasonable danger" language in ReynoldS22 and is
a function of three variables: (1) the magnitude of harm to the public;
(2) the likelihood that disclosing the information at issue will result in
that harm; and (3) the importance of the information to the case of
the party requesting it. The margin of scrutiny deference then guides
the extent to which ajudge should trust, with limited information, the
14 See, e.g., Editorial, Supreme Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A30 (commenting
that the district court "dismissed [el-Masri's] civil suit in a reflexive bow to a flimsy govern-
ment claim").
15 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 216-24
(1974); Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745,
760-61 (1991); Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 156 (2006); William G. Weaver & Robert M.
Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. Sci. Q. 85, 107-12 (2005);J. Steven Gard-
ner, Comment, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A Proposal for Statutory
Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 586-87, 589-91 (1994); Note, The Military and State
Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J.
570, 586-88 (1982). See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of
Powers, 75 FOROHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007) (discussing the history of the privilege, recent case
law implicating the privilege, and offering a general criticism of the privilege).
16 See Christopher Brancart, Rethinking the State Secrets Privilege, 9 WHITrIER L. REv. 1,
14-15 (1987).
17 See Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE Reynolds Case 257 (2006); Veronica M. Fallon, Note, Keeping Secrets From the
Jury: New Options for Safeguarding State Secrets, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 94, 107-09 (1978); Barry
A. Stulberg, Comment, State Secrets Privilege: The Executive Caprice Runs Rampant, 9 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 478-79 (1986); Note, supra note 15, at 583-86.
18 See Brancart, supra note 15, at 24-25; Fallon, supra note 17, at I 10-11; Note, supra
note 15, at 588.
19 SeeJames Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875, 897-98 (1966).
20 See Gardner, supra note 15, at 598-609 (proposing statutory schemes based on com-
pensating individuals).
21 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 17, at 258; Fuchs, supra note 15, at 163-75; Christina E.
Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REV. 903, 906-09, 939-48 (2004).
22 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
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executive official's claim that the circumstances of the case satisfy the
trigger test. The margin of scrutiny deference is also a function of
three variables: (1) the degree to which the executive official is more
qualified than the reviewing judge to accurately assess the variables in
the trigger test; (2) the likelihood that factors irrelevant to pubic
safety influenced the executive official's judgment; and (3) the
amount of relevant information that the executive official considered
but withheld from the reviewingjudge. The result is a schematic that
will help guide judges to identify those cases in which deference is
more or less appropriate and yet is flexible enough to accommodate a
wide range of views regarding how much deference is appropriate in
absolute terms.
Part I briefly recounts the history of the state secrets privilege.
Part II explores the modern framework for evaluating state secrets
privilege claims, identifying where ambiguities and inconsistencies
have rendered the analysis incoherent. Part III offers an analytical
framework, derived from Reynolds, that accounts for the ambiguities




The origins of the state secrets privilege are "obscure and con-
fused."24 Two lines of cases intersected in 1953 to form the modern
doctrine, one from each side of the Atlantic.25 In the United States,
many courts and commentators trace the privilege's origin to the trial
of Aaron Burr.26 On trial for treason, Burr sought access to a letter
23 For a thorough treatment of the privilege's history, see generally Robert M.
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1249, 1270-1300 (2007); Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 2; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note
15, at 92-101.
24 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 93; see also Chesney, supra note 23, at 1270
(noting that the privilege's "nature and scope remain the subject of considerable uncer-
tainty"); Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 2, at 65, 68 (finding the origins of the doctrine
"not parts of a coherent whole" and Reynolds as "devoid of policy, theory, or principles").
25 Whether the privilege actually has any pre-Reynolds roots in the United States is a
point of contention. CompareJabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 483 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (claim-
ing that the privilege "can be traced as far back as Aaron Burr's trial in 1807"), with Weaver
& Escontrias, supra note 2, at 43 ("There is nothing in the way of state secrets jurisprudence
prior to the Reynolds decisions despite persistent claims to the contrary.").
26 See FISHER, supra note 17, at 212-13 (collecting judicial remarks identifying Burr's
trial as the privilege's origin). But seeWeaver & Escontrias, supra note 2, at 47-52. William
Weaver and Danielle Escontrias have insisted that "the privilege sprang upon the Republic
fully mature in the Reynolds case, which relied heavily on English precedent." Id. at 12.




that General Wilkinson had sent to President Jefferson that purport-
edly confirmed Burr's guilt. 27 The prosecution insisted that it was
improper to call upon the president to produce the letter of Gen.
Wilkinson, because it was a private letter, and probably contained
confidential communications, which the president ought not and
could not be compelled to disclose. It might contain state secrets, which
could not be divulged without endangering the national safety.28
Chief Justice Marshall, 29 rejecting the prosecution's argument, admit-
ted that "there may be matter, the production of which the court
would not require." 30 Elaborating, he stated: "There is certainly noth-
ing before the court which shows that the letter in question contains
any matter the disclosure of which would endanger the public
safety."31
In the 1875 case of Totten v. United States, the estate of an alleged
spy sued the government to enforce a contract for espionage services
that the estate claimed the deceased spy had entered into with the
President.32 Justice Field, writing for the Supreme Court, chastised
the lower courts for even considering the merits of the case.3 3 He
concluded:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law it-
self regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow
the confidence to be violated. 34
Totten's relationship to the modern state secrets privilege is un-
clear. In the 2005 case of Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme Court explicitly
distinguished the Totten doctrine from the Reynolds doctrine.3 5 Wil-
liam Weaver and Robert Pallitto argue that both Burr and Totten are
"more properly considered executive privilege" cases, the reasoning of
which is grounded in the separation of powers doctrine. 36 The dis-
27 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 30 (Marshall, CircuitJustice, D. Va. 1807).
28 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). Compare the language from Burr with that of the
Court in United States v. Reynolds. "It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the cir-
cumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged."
345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (emphasis added).
29 Chief Justice Marshall was riding circuit.
30 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
31 Id.
32 See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1875).
33 See id.
34 Id. at 107.
35 See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2005).
36 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 93.
1248 [Vol. 93:1243
JUDGING WITHOUT THE FACTS
tinction between the state secrets privilege and executive privilege,
however, is a recent one.3 7
Developments on the other side of the Atlantic may have had a
more significant influence on the modern state secrets privilege. The
1860 case of Beatson v. Skene concerned slanderous comments Skene
had allegedly made against Beatson, the commander of a cavalry unit
in the Crimean War.3 8 During the trial, the court subpoenaed the
Secretary of State for War to produce certain letters that Beatson had
written to Skene. 39 The Secretary objected "on the ground that his
doing so would be injurious to the public service.140 The judge
agreed: "We are of opinion that, if the production of a State paper
would be injurious to the public service, the general public interest
must be considered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in
a Court of justice .... -41 Whether the information posed such a
threat, the court continued, "must be determined, not by the Judge
but by the head of the department having the custody of the paper. 42
Over eighty years later, in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., the House
of Lords affirmed Beatson's approach, stating that "the approved prac-
tice . . . is to treat a ministerial objection taken in proper form as
conclusive. 4 3
B. Reynolds
On October 6, 1948, six years after Duncan, an Air Force B-29
bomber crashed in Waycross, Georgia.44 Nine people died, including
three civilian engineers. 45 The widows of the deceased engineers
each sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act seeking damages for
wrongful death. 46 During discovery, one of the plaintiffs requested a
copy of the crash report.47 The government refused to disclose it,
37 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1276-77 (noting that the first American evidence
treatise, published in 1842, did not distinguish between cases in which the government
withheld information under a deliberative-process rationale from those in which it with-
held information under a security rationale). Even after Reynolds, courts struggled to dis-
tinguish the qualified executive privilege from the absolute state secrets privilege. See
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-10 (1974) (permanently separating the two privi-
lege doctrines); United States v. Abmad, 499 F.2d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1974).
38 (1860) 157 Eng. Rep. 1415, 1420 (Exch. Div.).




43 See Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. [1942] A.C. 624, 641 (H.L.). This part of
Duncan was overruled in Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, 911 (H.L.).







claiming that disclosure would "seriously hamper[ ] national security,
flying safety, and the development of highly technical and secret mili-
tary equipment. ' 48 In response, the district court ordered the report's
disclosure for in camera review. 49 The government appealed.
The Third Circuit also rejected the government's privilege
claim. 50 In doing so, it made two important contributions to the state
secrets privilege. 51 First, it noted that "[s] tate secrets of a diplomatic
or military nature have always been privileged from disclosure in any
proceeding.'52 Second, it stated that the court, not the government,
is the privilege's gatekeeper, distinguishing Duncan by noting that
"whatever may be true in Great Britain the Government of the United
States is one of checks and balances." 53
On March 9, 1953, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
government need not disclose the crash report.54 The Court adopted
Duncan's framework "nearly in toto,"'5 5 following the Third Circuit only
in its conclusion that the judiciary, not the executive, ultimately deter-
mines whether the privilege applies.56 Despite acknowledging its
gatekeeping function, the Court made its determination that the privi-
lege applied without even examining the crash report.57 Lower court
improvisations and divisions aside, Reynolds continues to be the mod-
ern framework for analyzing state secrets privilege claims.58
C. Post-Reynolds
In Reynolds, the government invoked the privilege to prevent the
disclosure of a crash report that might have contained information
about secret military missions. Does Reynolds apply, however, when
the government is the defendant, accused of constitutional violations?
In the 1967 case of Elson v. Bowen, the Supreme Court of Nevada ap-
pears to have answered that question in the negative. 5 9 Elson was a
48 See id. at 990.
49 See id. at 990-91; Chesney, supra note 23, at 1284.
50 See Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 998.
51 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1284-85.
52 Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 996.
53 Id. at 997.
54 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1953).
55 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 98 (criticizing Reynolds's reliance on Duncan).
56 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
57 See id. at 11. The crash report's actual contents, discovered in 2000 through a Free-
dom of Information Act request, did not include any sensitive information. See FISHER,
supra note 17, at 165, 176-77. For a thorough discussion of Reynolds, the crash report, and
subsequent litigation, see generally FISHER, supra note 17.
58 See infra Part H.A.
59 436 P.2d 12, 15 (Nev. 1967) ("Of the numerous authorities relating to the question
of discovery from governmental agents and agencies none directly involve the seeking of
information from the agents who are parties in the litigation and whose alleged illegal
activities are the subject of the lawsuit."). Although at least one influential commentator
1250 [Vol. 93:1243
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consolidation of lawsuits arising from the FBI's alleged wiretapping of
Las Vegas hotels. 60 Among the defendants were five FBI agents ac-
cused of performing the "actual 'bugging.'- 61 The plaintiffs hoped to
learn from Elson, one of the agents, the "identities, methods, loca-
tions, and other relevant information" concerning the surveillance op-
eration. 62 The Attorney General instructed Elson not to disclose the
requested information because it would "reveal F.B.I. tactical
secrets." 63 The court rejected the claim of privilege on two grounds.
First, the requested information was no longer a secret.64 And sec-
ond, after discussing Reynolds, the court stated: "Government cannot
break the law to enforce the law, . . . and it follows that government
should not be allowed to use the claim[ I of executive privilege ... as
a shield of immunity for the unlawful conduct of its representatives. 65
The Elson court's conception of the relationship between Reyn-
olds, executive privilege, the state secrets privilege, and claims of na-
tional security is not entirely consistent with today's understanding.
Although it is unclear whether the Elson court ultimately based its
holding on the state secrets privilege or executive privilege, it seemed
to conclude that when government officials are accused of violating
an individual's Fourth Amendment right to privacy through warrant-
less surveillance, the government cannot escape liability by invoking
an evidentiary privilege. 66 The Elson approach received indirect sup-
port in one federal district court decision, 67 but the government's suc-
cessful invocation of the privilege in a spate of warrantless surveillance
cases in the late 1970s and 1980s put to rest any lingering doubt as to
whether the government could use the privilege when accused of
breaking the law.68
A couple of off-hand remarks in the non-state secrets privilege
case of United States v. Nixon contributed significantly to the privilege's
has read Elson as answering that question in the negative by rendering "the privilege ...
categorically inapplicable when the government stands accused of unconstitutional con-
duct," Chesney supra, note 23, at 1291, Elson could also be read as simply reducing judicial
deference to executive assertions of privilege under the case's circumstances. The latter
reading better comports with this Note's proposed analysis.
60 See Elson, 436 P.2d at 13.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 15.
63 See id. at 16.
64 See id. at 15-16.
65 Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
66 See id.
67 See Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 101-02 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 564
F.2d 531 (1977) ("Any evidence which concerns the government's illegal acts are not
privileged.").
68 See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978); ACLU v. Brown,
619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc);Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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modern identity. First, the Nixon court distinguished the state secrets
privilege from the better-known executive privilege. 69 In doing so, it
noted that although the executive privilege is qualified, the state
secrets privilege is absolute. 70 Then, the Court associated the privi-
lege (albeit obliquely) with Article II and the separation of powers. 71
And finally, it stated that the privilege may be within the category of
executive decisions entitled to "utmost deference."
72
The post-Nixon state secrets privilege first arose in full form in a
D.C. Circuit decision, Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1).73 In Halkin I, twenty-
seven former Vietnam War protesters sued former and present offi-
cials in the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Secret
Service, alleging constitutional and statutory violations arising out of
warrantless surveillance. 74 The Secretary of Defense invoked the privi-
lege, claiming that disclosing whether the alleged surveillance took
place "would reveal important military and state secrets respecting the
capabilities of the NSA for the collection and analysis of foreign
intelligence. '75
The D.C. Circuit's Halkin I analysis has guided other courts' ap-
proaches to the state secrets privilege. First, the Halkin I court found
it irrelevant that the very information at issue would establish the
plaintiffs' prima facie case for a constitutional violation. 76 Second, the
court approved the district court's decision to consider two govern-
ment affidavits in favor of the motion, one public and one private, the
private affidavit viewed in camera and withheld from plaintiffs' counsel
entirely.77
Finally, the court employed the "mosaic theory"78 to justify its
heightened deference to the Secretary of Defense.7 9 To illustrate the
69 See 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
70 See id.; see also infta Part II.B.2.
71 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 707, 710; see also infra Part II.B.4.c.
72 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (referring to "military or diplomatic secrets"); see also infra
Part II.B.3.
73 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
74 See id. at 3.
75 Id. at 4.
76 See id. at 10-11 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument for a presumption of acquisition to
enable them to avoid dismissal).
77 See id. at 6-8.
78 "The 'mosaic theory' describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Disparate
items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can
take on added significance when combined with other items of information." David E.
Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE LI.
628, 630 (2005). For more on the mosaic theory generally, see Pozen, supra; Christina E.
Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 845 (2006); see
also infra Part II.B.3.
79 See Halkin 1, 598 F.2d at 8-9.
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applicability of the mosaic theory, the court described a few of the
"number of inferences [that] flow from the confirmation or denial of
acquisition," thus dispensing with the plaintiffs' "naive" argument that
mere admission or denial of surveillance would not disclose the agen-
cies' methods and techniques.80 After Halkin I, the mosaic theory be-
came a mainstay in state secrets privilege litigation.'
D. Trends
Several commentators claim that the executive and judiciary to-
day are using the privilege differently than in the past. Between 1954
and 1972, only six published opinions considered assertions of the
state secrets privilege.8 2 From 1973 to 2001, sixty-five published opin-
ions considered assertions of the privilege. 3 And since 2002, twenty-
six published opinions have dealt with the state secrets privilege.8 4
William Weaver and Robert Pallitto argue that "[r]ecent use of the
state secrets privilege shows a tendency on the part of the executive
branch to expand the privilege to cover a wide variety of contexts."85
They further argue that the ease with which the government can in-
voke the privilege combined with mosaic-theory deference have re-
sulted in the "courts' demonstrated reluctance to even conduct in
camera inspections of material before affirming secrecy."86 Other
commentators find that the government is increasingly using the privi-
lege to dismiss entire cases rather than merely to block discovery
requests.8 7
A recent article by Robert Chesney disputes these claims.88 First,
Chesney finds the quantitative increase in state secrets privilege claims
irrelevant because it is too small to be statistically significant and is
potentially attributable to other causes.8 9 Turning to the qualitative
80 See Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8-9.
81 See, e.g., el-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007); Kasza v.
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119
n.5 (8th Cir. 1995); In re U.S., 872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709
F.2d 51, 58 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
82 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1298 chart 1.
83 See id.
84 This number is based on eighteen cases listed in Chesney's data, see id. at 1330-32,
and updated to include an additional eight cases decided between his study and May 28,
2008.
85 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 107; see also FISHER, supra note 17, at 212, 245
(noting the increasing use and broadening scope of the state secrets privilege after Sep-
tember 11, 2001).
86 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 108.
87 See Frost, supra note 15, at 1932-35; Shayana Kadidal, The State Secrets Privilege and
Executive Misconduct, JURST F., May 30, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/05/
state-secrets-privilege-and-executive.php; see also Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 2, at 10
n.25 (observing that cases rarely continue once the government has invoked the privilege).
88 See Chesney, supra note 23.
89 See id. at 1301-02.
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use of the privilege, Chesney finds that the government is not apply-
ing the privilege more broadly than in the past;90 that the govern-
ment's recent use of the privilege to dismiss entire cases is not a break
with past usage;91 and, finally, that no reason exists to believe judicial
review of privilege claims has relaxed.92
This Note does not enter the above debate. Its focus is not on
potential abuse of the privilege in practice; the ideal balance between
individuals' litigation interests, the rule of law, and national security;
or the extent to which the judiciary should scrutinize state secrets priv-
ilege claims in absolute terms. Instead, its focus is on the analysis in the
abstract and the extent to which the judiciary should scrutinize state
secrets privilege claims in relative terms. In other words, this Note fo-
cuses on developing a conceptual framework to help judges identify
which claims of state secrets privilege deserve more or less judicial
deference. The following section examines how courts currently ana-
lyze state secrets privilege claims.
II
THE CONFUSED REYNOLDS ANALYjsIS
The Reynolds opinion has language to support almost any out-
come. Consequently, it is common in state secrets privilege cases for
the government to quote half of the opinion in its motion to invoke
the privilege,93 for the party seeking the information to quote the
other half of the opinion in opposition, 94 and for the court to ac-
knowledge both halves of Reynolds before engaging in an unrelated
analysis. 95  Indeed, courts tend to substitute for analysis vague
90 See id. at 1302-04.
91 See id. at 1304-05.
92 See id. at 1305-06.
93 See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion by Inter-
venor United States to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for SummaryJudgment at 4, el-Masri
v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05cvl417-TSE-TRJ), affd, 479 F.3d
296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/safefree/govtmot .dismiss.pdf ("The state secrets privilege is one of the privileges
that belong uniquely to the Executive Branch, facilitating the Chief Executive's right and
duty to protect the military and state secrets of the nation.").
94 See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the United
States' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 15, el-Masri v.
Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05cv1417-TSE-TRJ), available at http://
www.acl.org/pdfs/safefree/elmasri-final-brief.pdf ("'[J]udicial control over the evi-
dence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.'") (quoting
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953)).
95 See, e.g., el-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 373 (2007) ("The Reynolds Court recognized . . . that 'Li]udicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers'-no matter
how great the interest in national security-but that the President's ability to preserve state
secrets likewise cannot be placed entirely at the mercy of the courts.") (quoting Reynolds,
345 U.S. at 9-10).
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passages from Reynolds.9 6 This section explores the language of the
Reynolds opinion, noting where inconsistencies and ambiguities have
rendered it incoherent.
A. The Analysis
The state secrets privilege belongs exclusively to the government,
and the government can assert it even if not a party to the action. 97
Only the head of the department with control over the information
can invoke the privilege and even then only after personally consider-
ing the information at issue.9 8 Thus, a private party can neither claim
nor waive the privilege. 99 The judge, however, ultimately determines
whether the privilege applies. 0 0 Here, the Reynolds court admits, is
the "real difficulty."'' Although Reynolds does not "automatically re-
quire a complete disclosure to the judge,"1 0 2 neither can "U]udicial
control over the evidence in a case ... be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers."'' 13 The tension is that "[t]oo much judicial inquiry
into the claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the priv-
ilege was meant to protect, while a complete abandonment of judicial
control would lead to intolerable abuses."' 0 4
Reynolds attempted to strike a "compromise": 0 5 "It may be possi-
ble to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not
be divulged."' 0 6 The extent to which the judge should probe the evi-
dence depends on the "showing of necessity" of the party requesting
the information. 0 7 Nevertheless, once the judge is satisfied that "mili-
tary secrets are at stake," the privilege applies absolutely, precluding
any consideration of injury to the requesting party.'0 8
96 See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that
Reynolds's principles "'emerge quite clearly from the available precedents'" but then pro-
ceeding to quote Reynolds's frequently cited and troublesome passages, such as "'[tihe
court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is de-
signed to protect"') (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7).
97 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
98 Id. at 7-8.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 8 n.21 ("'[T]he decision ruling out such documents is the decision of the
judge. . . . It is the judge who is in control of the trial, not the executive."') (quoting
Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624, 642 (H.L.)) (emphasis omitted).
101 Id. at 8.
102 Id. at 10.
103 Id. at 9-10.
104 id. at 8.
105 Id. at 9.
106 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 11.
108 Id.
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Finally, the judge must determine the consequence of a success-
ful invocation of the privilege. 10 9 The general rule is that the action
proceeds as though the "'evidence is unavailable, as though a witness
ha[s] died."' 110 But various circumstances exist under which the
court would dismiss the entire case:"II if the privileged information is
necessary to the plaintiffs prima facie case; 1 2 if the very subject mat-
ter of the action is a state secret; 113 if the privilege deprives the defen-
dant of an otherwise valid defense; 114 if the privileged information is
not in the government's possession; l l5 and if without the privileged
information, the plaintiff cannot establish standing. 116 In practice,
few cases continue after the government successfully invokes the
privilege.117
B. The Problems
Despite this framework, Reynolds has proven more useful as a
source of rhetoric than as a source of analytical guidance.1 8 This sub-
part addresses several areas of confusion: the situations in which the
privilege applies; the relevance of competing interests; and the mean-
ing, scope, and rationale of judicial deference to state secrets claims.
109 See id.; Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
110 Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 233 (Edward W. Cleary
ed., 2d ed. 1972)).
11 Some courts have deemed dismissal "draconian." See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494
F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In reUnited States, 872 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
112 See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 65 (finding dismissal appropriate if "plaintiffs were mani-
festly unable to make out a primafacie case without the requested information"); Farns-
worth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam);
In re United States, 872 F.2d at 476.
113 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875));
el-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373
(2007); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d
1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995);
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1992). Some courts
consider the issue of whether the very subject matter of the action is a state secret to be a
threshold question distinct from whether a particular document or topic is a state secret.
See, e.g., AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2007).
114 SeeTenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1000 (2004); Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1141; see also In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d at 150 (stating that the defense must be more than "potential" or "colorable").
115 See Farnsworth, 635 F.2d at 281 (reasoning that the parties would have an incentive
to probe too close to the sensitive information); see also Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 65 (discussing
the Farnsworth rule).
116 See AI-Haramain Islamic Found., 507 F.3d at 1205.
117 See Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 2, at 10 n.25.
118 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1251 (observing that "much uncertainty remains re-
garding [the] parameters and justifications" of the state secrets privilege).
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1. Reynolds's Trigger Test
Reynolds's trigger test derives from the following passage: "It may
be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case,
that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged."' 19 This test clearly incorporates the magni-
tude and likelihood of harm to the public. The magnitude of harm is
implicit in the phrase "national security," while the requisite likeli-
hood that that harm will occur is implicit in the phrase "reasonable
danger." As a function of these two variables, Reynolds intended to
design a privilege that avoids injury to the public caused by the under-
mining of national security.1 20
The trigger test's great ambiguity is whether the magnitude and
likelihood variables refer to actual public harm or whether they refer
to some proxy that has a reasonable chance of leading to actual public
harm. For example, although a near-100 percent chance may exist
that litigation without the privilege would disclose sensitive informa-
tion, perhaps only a 10 percent chance exists that bad people would
actually use that information to harm the public. Between those two
extreme possibilities, perhaps a 50 percent chance exists that should
litigation proceed without the privilege, bad people would acquire
sensitive information and increase their ability to harm the public.
Thus, a broad disclosure-to-harm spectrum exists with an infinite
number of inferential steps required to find public harm from the
disclosure of sensitive information.
The Reynolds court repeatedly emphasized the "reasonable possi-
bility that military secrets were involved," 12 1 suggesting that the Court
was focusing on the disclosure of sensitive information, rather than
actual harm to the public. At the same time, however, the Court also
spoke of disclosure that "might be dangerous because injurious" to
the public. 12 2 The critical question is whether the Reynolds analysis
focuses on both disclosure and harm as distinct factors or whether it
equates the two.
One possibility is that the Reynolds court intended the govern-
ment to focus on harm and the reviewing judge to focus on disclosure.
According to one commentator, Reynolds uses the phrase "reasonable
danger" to refer to two distinct measures: a measure of potential harm
to the public and a measure of whether the documents at issue actually
119 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (emphasis added).
120 See id. ("[T]he court should notjeopardize the security which the privilege is meant
to protect ....").
121 Id. at 11; see id. at 10.
122 Id. at 9.
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contain sensitive information. 12 3 Of these two measures, the govern-
ment's focus is clearly on potential harm to the public. 124 Given this
governmental focus, however, it makes little sense for the reviewing
judge to focus exclusively on whether the documents in fact contain
the information that the department invoking the privilege wants to
protect. In addition to being an ineffective method of reviewing the
government's invocation of the privilege, this form of review would
also be disrespectful. Under Reynolds, the head of a department must
personally review the requested information before invoking the privi-
lege.1 25 Therefore, if the judge focuses exclusively on whether the
documents contain the information that the head of the department
claims, the judge's decision hinges entirely on an assessment of the
head of the department's honesty. In contrast, if the judge focuses on
the effect the information might have if leaked, the judge questions the
head of the department's judgment.
If Reynolds simply failed to appreciate the difference between dis-
closure and harm, it leaves open the question of where on the disclo-
sure-to-harm spectrum the government and reviewing judge should
focus their analyses. "National security" is an unfortunately generic
term. 126 In the state secrets privilege context, undermining national
security refers to impairing defense capabilities, 127 disclosing intelli-
gence-gathering methods or capabilities, 128 and disrupting diplomatic
relations with foreign governments. 129 Each of these threats to na-
tional security requires a different chain of inferences to find harm
from disclosure. For example, consider the disclosure of intelligence-
gathering methods or capabilities. What is the harm? Do the opera-
tions for which the government uses the methods matter? Do the po-
tential consequences-to human life or otherwise-of disclosing
those methods or abandoning particular operations as a result of dis-
closing details of those operations matter? For an example of a longer
123 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1287.
124 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting the Secretary of the Air Force as noting that
"'it would not be in the public interest to furnish this report"' and the JAG officer han-
dling the case as arguing that "the demanded material could not be furnished 'without
seriously hampering national security'").
125 See id. at 8.
126 See Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 2, at 70 (finding that national security is a
"nimble term that effordessly adapts to myriad contexts" and quoting former Director of
Central Intelligence, Sidney Souers, as saying that the term is merely a "point of view"); see
also N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 739-40 (1971) (noting that "national de-
fense" is a generic term not susceptible to precise definition) (citing Gorin v United States,
312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941));Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 483 n.25 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (same).
127 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7, 10.
128 See Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I1), 690 F.2d 977, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Halkin 1, 598
F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
129 See Halkin 11, 690 F.2d at 990 n.53; Republic of China v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
142 F. Supp. 551, 556 (D. Md. 1956).
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chain of inferences, consider the disruption of diplomatic relations
with foreign governments. The chain of inferences might be as fol-
lows: disclosure would reveal conversations between the United States
and a second country regarding a third country; those conversations,
in turn, would strain the already delicate relationship between the
United States and the third country; as a result, this strained relation-
ship would cause public harm through some unforeseen
consequence.' 30
Understandably, courts are reluctant to engage in this type of
analysis. Indeed, assuming that events with high probabilities of caus-
ing harm actually cause harm makes sense. For example, impairment
of defense capabilities, although not directly harming the public, may
have a high enough probability of causing public harm to remove the
need to speculate about causation. It is important, however, to recog-
nize that impaired defense capabilities is not the same thing as harm
to the public. Yet the Reynolds analysis fails entirely to account for the
causal-and sometimes very speculative-inferences required to find
public harm from disclosure. Moreover, the Reynolds analysis also fails
to account for the magnitude of public harm. For example, strained
diplomatic relations might result in a wide range of public harms,
from economic recession to nuclear war. In sum, because Reynolds
does not require the government to articulate the potential public
harm, even in general terms, the likelihood variable of the trigger test
is insufficient and the magnitude variable is constrained only by the
vague category of "national security" threat.
The lower courts have struggled to implement the Reynolds stan-
dard. Some courts have rephrased the reasonable danger standard to
bridge the gap between disclosure and harm.13 For example, in
Halkin I, the court referred to the standard as the "'reasonable dan-
ger' that confirmation or denial that a particular plaintiff's communi-
cations have been acquired would disclose NSA capabilities and other
valuable intelligence information to a sophisticated intelligence ana-
lyst."'1 32 Similarly, in Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the court referred to the stan-
dard as whether "there is a 'reasonable danger' that revelation of the
information in question would either enable a sophisticated analyst to
gain insights into the nation's intelligence-gathering methods and ca-
pabilities or would disrupt diplomatic relations with foreign govern-
ments."' 33 Halkin !and Ellsberg both focus their analysis on a step in
the middle of the disclosure-to-harm spectrum: the likelihood that a
13o The first two steps are based on Nat'l Union Fire Ins., 142 F. Supp. at 553.
131 Whether courts are actually applying the standard differently is unclear because the
details of these cases are often classified.
132 Halkin 1, 598 F.2d at 10 (citations omitted).
133 709 F.2d 51, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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foreign agent might obtain and understand information that could
harm the public.134
Other lower courts have interpreted the standard as focusing
more directly on the harm to the public. In Halkin H!, the court stated
that "the determination is whether the showing of the harm that
might reasonably be seen to flow from disclosure is adequate in a
given case to trigger the absolute right to withhold the information
sought in that case." 135
In most cases, it is not clear how the court is applying the test.
Courts will commonly quote the ambiguous language from Reynolds136
and move on without clarifying how they applied the standard.1 37
Often, courts simply don't acknowledge the ambiguity. For example,
in Tenenbaum v. Simonini, the court articulated a standard somewhere
in the middle of the disclosure-to-harm spectrum 138 and then attrib-
uted that standard to Reynolds, including, in a parenthetical, a quote
of Reynolds's ambiguous but seemingly disclosure-focused standard. 139
134 Compare Halkin land Ellsberg to Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d
395 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Northrop, the Department of Defense (DOD) provided a list of the
categories of sensitive information requested by the other party. Id. at 400. These catego-
ries included communications with foreign governments, letters between the DOD and the
Secretary of State or the President, studies of the force structures of foreign countries, and
recommendations relating to military aircraft sales. See id. The DOD then correlated each
category to a specific "harm" (although still an inference removed from injury to the pub-
lic), such as adversely affecting U.S. relations with Iran, revealing defense capabilities to
foreign countries, and exposing sources of intelligence information. See id. The DOD
even explained the magnitude of the threat, suggesting that disclosure would have "' irrepa-
rable effects upon the national security and international relations of the United States."' Id.
(quoting Aff. and Claim of Privilege of the Secretary of Defense 7) (emphasis added).
135 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Halkin II court may not have actually
focused on harm to the public. In one passage, the court states that "it is obvious that the
exposure of one who acted-and indeed may still be acting-as a CIA operative here and
abroad would pose a threat to our diplomatic and military interests"; elsewhere it states
that disclosure might render foreign government officials "subject to political or legal ac-
tion" as a consequence of cooperating with the CIA. Id. at 993. It is unclear whether the
government affidavit spelled out, in more specific terms, how disclosure could potentially
result in public harm.
136 "It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged." United States v. Reyn-
olds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
137 See, e.g., el-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 373 (2007); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2005); Crater Corp. v.
Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Trulock v. Lee, 66 F. App'x 472, 475
(4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
138 See Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he state secrets
doctrine applies because a reasonable danger exists that disclosing the information in
court proceedings would harm national security interests .... ").
139 See id. (characterizing Reynolds as permitting "courts [to] accept the government's
assertion of the state secrets privilege if they are satisfied that there is a 'reasonable danger'
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In sum, Reynolds does not distinguish the risk of disclosing sensi-
tive information from the risk that disclosing that information would
harm the public. A government official who is aware of the contents
of the requested information bases invocation of the privilege on the
likelihood of harm to the public. In doing so, the government official
must consider the inferential steps required to get from disclosure to
harm. It is not clear, however, whether Reynolds intended reviewing
courts to evaluate the official's judgment in the disclosure-to-harm
analysis or to take the vastly more restrained-yet, at the same time,
less respectful-role of reviewing only the official's honesty.
2. Where the Trigger Test and Deference Overlap: The Requesting
Party's Interest
Reynolds, at least implicitly, 140 sets forth the ingredients for a qual-
ified privilege-the likelihood and magnitude of harm to the public
as well as the requesting party's interest-while creating an absolute
privilege by virtue of how it organizes those ingredients. The Court
addressed the likelihood and magnitude of harm in the trigger test
context: the state secrets privilege does not apply unless a "reasonable
danger" exists that disclosure will undermine national security. 141 But
the Court addressed the requesting party's interest when determining
the amount of judicial deference the government receives: the more
compelling the party's need for the information, the more informa-
tion the judge should require when reviewing the privilege claim.' 4 2
This section concludes that a reviewing judge should consider the
public's interest and the requesting party's interest together as a part
of the trigger test rather than when determining the appropriate
amount of judicial deference.
In state secrets privilege cases, deference emerges in one princi-
pal way:'43 how deeply the judge should probe the requested informa-
tion. Reynolds speaks to this issue in two passages. First, after
disclaiming the notion that a "court may automatically require a com-
plete disclosure to the judge,"'14 4 the Court continued:
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of
the case, that there is a reasonable danger .... When this is the
case ... the court should notjeopardize the security which the privi-
that disclosing the evidence will expose information that 'in the interest of national secur-
ity, should not be divulged'").
140 See supra Part 11.3.1 (concluding that Reynolds equated the risk of disclosure of sen-
sitive information with the risk of harm to the public).
141 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); see also supra Part IBI.
142 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
143 As this Note explains below, issues of deference could also emerge in other ways if
there were no cost to submitting sensitive information for a judge's in camera review.
144 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
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lege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. 1 45
Then, three paragraphs later, the Court appeared to elaborate on this
standard:
In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine
how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion
for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong
showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly
accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome
the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake. 14 6
But does the second passage simply elaborate on the first? Does
the first passage speak to deference at all? A better way to read the
first passage is that it simply instructs judges not to force the disclo-
sure of information that will not aid them in their decision. Trulock v.
Lee provides an example of a case in which a court appropriately de-
clined to review information that would not assist it in its decision. 14 7
The plaintiff in Trulock, the former head of the Office of Energy Intel-
ligence, brought a suit against Lee, accusing Lee and two other offi-
cials of defaming him "with statements that his part in the
investigation of Lee [for mishandling sensitive nuclear weapons infor-
mation] was motivated by racial bias."' 48 Trulock requested a govern-
ment report that summarized the Department of Justice's findings
from its investigation of the nuclear weapons matter. 149 After the
United States intervened and had the case dismissed on the ground of
state secrets privilege, Trulock appealed and challenged the court's
refusal to examine the report in camera.150 In rejecting his request,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because "[t] he subject matter of the
privileged information and of the lawsuit are the same knowing the
particular contents of specific documents would not have assisted the
court's decision.' 151 In other words, in cases where what makes the
information relevant also makes it sensitive, the courts have nothing
to gain from in camera review. In such cases, therefore, even if in cam-
era review creates only an insignificant risk to national security, a
judge should not probe the sensitive information.
The second passage, on the other hand, suggests a different way
of analyzing the issue. Here, the rationale seems to be that a greater
risk is acceptable when the requesting party's need is great. In Reyn-
145 Id. at 10.
146 Id. at 11.
147 66 F. App'x 472, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
148 Id. at 473.
149 Id. at 473-75.
150 Id. at 475-77.
151 Id. at 477-78.
1262 [Vol. 93:1243
JUDGING WITHOUT THE FACTS
olds, for example, the Court reasoned that in camera review was inap-
propriate because the plaintiffs did not need the requested
information to make their case. 152 But if this is the rationale, the anal-
ysis is inadequate because it fails to consider the magnitude and likeli-
hood of the national security threat. Although it is true that the stakes
are higher when the requesting party's interest is great, it is also true
that the stakes are higher when the magnitude and likelihood of harm
to the public is great.
Perhaps sensing this inadequacy, the D.C. Circuit in Ellsberg v.
Mitchelp 53 elaborated on Reynolds's deference calculus. Ellsberg found
"two critical considerations"'154 relevant to "[w]hether (and in what
spirit) the trial judge .. .should examine the materials sought to be
withheld."'155 In addition to the requesting party's showing of need,
"the more plausible and substantial the government's allegations of
danger to national security, in the context of all the circumstances
surrounding the case, the more deferential should be the judge's in-
quiry into the foundations and scope of the claim." 156 Although
clearly invoking the second Reynolds passage, 57 Ellsberg goes signifi-
cantly further. Under Ellsberg's balancing test, in addition to the re-
questing party's need, the judge should consider the likelihood and
magnitude of the government's claimed harm. In other words, the very
considerations that would ordinarily accompany a qualified privi-
lege-the balancing of competing interests discounted for their likeli-
hood-determine instead the amount of judicial deference.
Ellsberg's adaptation of Reynolds's deference calculus highlights
the inadequacy of Reynolds's trigger test: How can a privilege be abso-
lute when it is based on a broad category of national security threats,
without any additional consideration of the magnitude of the public
harm that might result from those threats, and when it includes only a
vague requirement that those harms be likely to occur? The Ellsberg
court appeared to recognize this problem and attempted to mitigate it
by according the executive less deference in cases where the harm is
unlikely or insubstantial. The problem is that deference only affects
the judge's determination of whether the circumstances of the case
satisfy the trigger test; it does not factor into the trigger test itself. As a
result, a trivial national security threat that is right at the threshold of
152 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); cf Al-Haramain Islamic
Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We reviewed the Sealed Docu-
ment in camera because of Al-Haramain's admittedly substantial need for the document to
establish its case.").
153 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
154 See Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 59.
157 See supra text accompanying note 146.
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being reasonably likely to occur will always trump the requesting
party's most compelling showing of need.
The cost of Reynolds and Ellsberg's misplaced analysis is not worth
the benefit of the absolute privilege it creates. The benefit of the priv-
ilege's absolute nature is largely illusory-more valuable symbolically
than in its legal effect. The qualifier only means that where the privi-
lege applies, it applies without exception. The real question is under
what conditions does the privilege apply. Admittedly, differences be-
tween the state secrets privilege and the executive privilege, for exam-
ple, do support making the former less qualified than the latter.
Whereas an individual's need might outweigh a weak showing of need
for executive privilege, an individual's need can never outweigh the
public's safety. 158 But it is not true that a very remote probability of
harm to the public should always outweigh an individual's interest.
Therefore, the requesting party's interest should more appropriately
join the magnitude and likelihood of harm to the public in the initial
trigger test.159 The amount of information a judge should review
before affirming an executive official's privilege claim ought to track
the rationale driving judicial deference, an area this Note explores
below.
3. Deference: How Much
Despite Reynolds's instruction that deference is a function of the
requesting party's need, the lower courts have generally taken their
guidance from a different source, employing a static "utmost defer-
ence" in all contexts. 160 Although the popularity of this standard is
further evidence of the inadequacy of Reynolds's deference calculus,
the standard's rigidity ignores its own driving rationale.
158 There are other counter-balancing interests in addition to the requesting party's
interest, such as the public's interest in the rule of law.
159 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007)
("In deciding whether the privilege attaches, we may consider a party's need for access to
the allegedly privileged information."). It is not clear whether the Ninth Circuit in Al-
Haramain intentionally shifted the relevance of the requesting party's interest or whether
the court simply misunderstood Reynolds on this point. Later in the opinion, the court
justified its review of classified documents on the basis of the requesting party's interest.
See id. at 1203.
160 Not all circuits have adopted the utmost deference standard. Recently, in Al-
Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, the Ninth Circuit discussed judicial deference in the
state secrets privilege context using language strikingly different from that used by other
circuits: "We take very seriously our obligation to review the documents with a very careful,
indeed a skeptical, eye, and not to accept at face value the government's claim orjustifica-
tion of privilege." Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203. In the same passage, however, the court
qualified this standard: "That said, we acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive on
matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves
second guessing the Executive in this arena." Id.
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The modem source of guidance regarding judicial deference in
the state secrets privilege context is United States v. Nixon.161 Prior to
Nixon, courts were not clear how the state secrets privilege related to
the better-known executive privilege. 162 In Nixon, the President
claimed the inherent power to withhold documents from the court.163
In response to this claim, the Court stated: "[President Nixon] does
not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are military or
diplomatic secrets. As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities."'164
Those two words, "utmost deference"-pure dicta themselves-
swept through the lower courts. Three years after Nixon, they surfaced
in a state secrets privilege case for the first time. InJabara v. Kelley, the
Eastern District of Michigan stated:
In the Nixon case, Chief Justice Burger, in distinguishing Mr.
Nixon's purported claim of executive privilege . . . stated that the
utmost deference has always been given to the President's Article II
duties and responsibilities over military and diplomatic matters.
This Court believes that the same consideration must be given to
the formal claim of privilege [here].165
The following year, the D.C. Circuit in Halkin I articulated the most
frequently cited version of that standard: "The standard of review here
is a narrow one. Courts should accord the 'utmost deference' to exec-
utive assertions of privilege upon grounds of military or diplomatic
secrets. ' 166 Dissenting from the denial of the petition to rehear the
case en banc, Judge Bazelon protested in vain: "The 'utmost defer-
ence' which the panel has given the government's ex parte, in camera
assertions is not justified in precedent, conflicts with other decisions
of this court... and slights the role of the court in protecting the civil
liberties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."1 67 Although courts
161 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
163 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 710.
164 Id. at 710 (emphasis added).
165 75 F.R.D. 475, 492 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
166 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710).




have used slight variations on the utmost deference standard, 6 this
standard has clearly been the norm since Halkin .169
4. Deference: Why
A court following Nixon and Reynolds is on uneasy ground.'7 0
Under Nixon, utmost deference is appropriate whenever a court is re-
viewing an executive determination concerning military and diplo-
matic matters. 1 7 1 Under Reynolds, however, deference operates on a
sliding scale.' 72 To reconcile these standards and apply them to new
and often complicated fact patterns, it is important to understand the
rationale for judicial deference in the state secrets privilege context.
This section explores potential rationales.
a. Risk of Exposure
In Reynolds, the concern was exposure. Reynolds states that "[t] oo
much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force disclo-
sure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect . . . ."73 This
rationale also supports Reynolds's instruction to accord the govern-
ment less deference when the requesting party's need is great. If the
Court justifies not reviewing all of the relevant documents on the
ground that it minimizes harm, it makes sense that a weighty showing
by the requesting party would tip the scale, warranting a more prob-
ing review. The exposure rationale therefore also supports Ellsberg's
balancing approach since a greater threat to national security might
neutralize the requesting party's need, tipping the scale back in the
other direction. 174
The risk-of-exposure rationale encompasses two distinct con-
cerns. First is the risk that judges will misuse or leak the information
168 The most common alternative is "considerable deference," first used in Ellsberg v.
Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983), but used frequently thereafter. See, e.g.,
Tenenbaum v. Simonini, 372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004); Moliero v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815,
822 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Ellsberg, the court employed the "considerable deference" stan-
dard but cited the standard to Halkin I, Halkin II, and Jabara v. Kelley, all of which use the
"utmost deference" articulation. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58 n.34. Therefore, it appears un-
likely that Ellsberg intended its standard to be substantively different from Nixon's.
169 See, e.g., el-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 373 (2007); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1021 (Fed Cir.
2003); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); Black v. United States, 62
F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995).
170 Because Ellsberg's deference calculus includes more variables than Reynolds's, a
court following Nixon and Ellsberg is on even shakier ground. This is, in fact, a problem
faced by a substantial number of courts because not only does the D.C. Circuit, which
decided Ellsberg, handle more state secrets privilege claims than any other circuit, but also
because several other circuits have adopted the Ellsberg approach.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 105-17.
173 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, at 8 (1953).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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themselves. 7 5 Commentators have nearly universally condemned this
rationale for refusing in camera review.1 76 Second is the risk that the
process of reviewing information in camera, despite everyone's best in-
tentions, will invariably result in leaked information. 177 But according
to Robert Chesney, this concern is a carryover from the English system
in which in camera review was not an option. 78
The risk of exposure is not substantial enough to drive judicial
deference. Yet, if there were no risk of exposure, there would be no
danger in providing a reviewing judge with all the relevant informa-
tion. Therefore, disclosure must have its costs, even if insubstantial. If
a judge had little need for additional information, even an insubstan-
tial cost would justify withholding the information. The real question
then is what benefit, if any, additional information provides the re-
viewing judge.
b. Institutional Competency
Despite Reynolds's reliance on the risk-of-exposure rationale, the
institutional competency rationale has attracted the most support. As
Robert Chesney puts it: 'Judges in general cannot be expected to have
the requisite expertise, experience, and knowledge necessary to make
fine-grained decisions regarding the national security implications of
175 See, e.g., Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005) ("Courts are not re-
quired to play with fire and chance further disclosure-inadvertent, mistaken, or even in-
tentional-that would defeat the very purpose for which the privilege exists.") (emphasis
added); Zagel, supra note 19, at 886, 897 ("[T]here are some things which even a judge
cannot be permitted to see."). This may be what the court was suggesting in Halkin I "'It is
not to slight judges, lawyers, or anyone else to suggest that any such disclosure carries with
it serious risk that highly sensitive information may be compromised."' 598 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (quoting Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975)).
176 See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2379, at
812 n.6 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) ("Shall every subordinate in the department have
access to the secret, and not the presiding officer ofjustice? Cannot the constitutionally
coordinated body of government share the confidence?"); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15,
at 98 ("It is unclear . . . why the lowliest private with a security clearance is held more
trustworthy than federal judges to handle classified information."); FISHER, supra note 17,
at 255 ('Judges take the same oath to protect and defend the Constitution, and judges are
not tempted, as executive officers are, to selectively leak classified and secret documents to
the public when it is advantageous to the administration."); see alsoJames Madison, Re-
marks at the Virginia Ratification Convention (June 20, 1788), in 3 JONATHAN ELLIOTT,
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 531, 535 ("Were I to select a power which might
be given with confidence, it would be judicial power.").
177 See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 n. 31 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("'In our own cham-
bers, we are ill equipped to provide the kind of security highly sensitive information should
have.'" (quoting Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1979)).
178 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1279-80 (discussing BeaLson v. Skene, (1860) 157 Eng.
Rep. 1415, 1421 (Exch. Div.), in which the court noted that review by the courts could not
take place in private).
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disclosure . *... ,179 Although criticized by some,180 those criticisms
have largely focused on the degree to which executive officials are in a
better position to make national security-related decisions. The con-
sensus is that although a complete abdication of judicial oversight is
undesirable, institutional competency differences warrant some defer-
ence to executive decision making.
If the justification for deference is grounded in expertise differ-
ences between the judiciary and the executive branch, should the
amount of deference vary depending on the size of the expertise dif-
ference? 18 1 In Halkin I-the first application of Nixon's utmost defer-
ence standard by a circuit court in a state secrets privilege case' 82-
the D.C. Circuit invoked the mosaic theory to justify its heightened
deference:
"The significance of one item of information may frequently de-
pend upon knowledge of many other items of information. What
may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to
one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned
item of information in its proper context. The courts, of course, are
ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence
matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in
that area."' 83
Five years later, in Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit again expressly
relied upon the institutional competency rationale: " [T] he probability
that a particular disclosure will have an adverse effect on national se-
179 See id. at 1288; see also Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 89 ("Agency officials
argue, and courts often agree, that judges and lay people are incompetent to assess the
danger that the release of information may pose to national security; the invocation of
'national security' gives strong, almost talismanic, force to claims of agency expertise.");
Stone, supra note 3, at 1316 ("[1]ndividual judges have relatively little first-hand experi-
ence with national security matters. Such cases arise infrequently, and judges are relative
novices when it comes to assessing the possible implications of their decisions for national
security."); Zagel, supra note 19, at 897 ("Only an experienced intelligence officer can
determine properly whether certain material should be kept secret.").
180 See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 75 (2004) ("Deliber-
ative processes within a unitary branch are likely to lead to an amplification of preexisting
tendencies, not toward a system of internal checks and balances."); Wells, supra note 21, at
929-36 (applying psychology of risk assessment to executive decision making during times
of emergency and finding a strong historical trend of overreaction).
181 Precedent in other contexts, particularly in the administrative law context, supports
such a spectrum. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) ("The fair
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its
consistency, formality, and relative expertness ... .") (footnotes omitted); see also Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (finding judicial review inappropriate where "an
agency decision .. .involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise").
182 See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
183 See Halkin 1, 598 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Marchetti,
466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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curity is difficult to assess, particularly for a judge with little expertise
in this area."' 8 4 Again, the court immediately followed this remark by
invoking the mosaic theory. 85 Other courts have also highlighted the
link between the utmost deference standard and the mosaic theory.18 6
All information, to some extent, is part of a mosaic. As David
Pozen observed in The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom
of Information Act, "Inasmuch as the rush to judicial collapse in the face
of 'mosaic' arguments has been predicated on a belief in their unique-
ness, it has lacked any legitimate analytic basis." 18 7 Mosaic cases are
different in degree rather than in kind. While all information is only
useful insofar as it is combined with other information, for some
mosaics, the link between the piece and the whole is readily apparent.
For other mosaics, however, the link requires a degree of speculation
and expertise for which ajudge is ill-suited. Since differences in insti-
tutional competency vary from case to case, a more rational approach
might be to vary judicial deference accordingly; but whether judges
are free to exert more or less deference on a case-by-case basis de-
pends, in part, on whether the Constitution mandates a more static
standard.
c. Separation of Powers
Articles II and III of the U.S. Constitution are the Scylla and Cha-
rybdis of the state secrets privilege. If courts defer entirely to the exec-
utive, they encounter one hazard; if courts disregard the executive's
national security and foreign relations interests entirely, they encoun-
ter a different hazard.188 The courts' judicious response has been to
steer as far from both as possible. The result is deferential judicial
oversight.189 The important question, however, is whether the Consti-
tution requires this compromise.
An exploration of the privilege's constitutional foundation must
begin with Reynolds. Before Reynolds reached the Supreme Court, the
Third Circuit had its own constitutional concerns. In response to the
government's argument that the court should not independently con-
sider the privilege claim once invoked, Judge Maris stated:
184 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
185 See id. at 58.
186 See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); In re United States,
872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
187 See Pozen, supra note 78, at 665.
188 See Note, supra note 15, at 581-82 ("When the courts face a valid privilege claim,
the Constitution poses a dilemma: the courts must respect the executive's constitutional
responsibility to protect national security interests; they also, however, must enforce consti-
tutional as well as congressional constraints on executive powers.").
189 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells,
69 Mo. L. REv. 959, 963 (2004) (describing the Supreme Court's policy of extraordinary
deference to the executive on military matters as a "compromise position").
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[T]o hold that the head of an executive department of the Govern-
ment in a suit to which the United States is a party may conclusively
determine the Government's claim of privilege is to abdicate the
judicial function and permit the executive branch of the Govern-
ment to infringe the independent province of the judiciary as laid
down by the Constitution.
190
In its petition for writ of certiorari, the government persisted, ask-
ing whether the judiciary had the power "to order production of doc-
uments which the executive chooses to withhold, or to substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the executive as to whether certain doc-
uments can be disclosed consistently with the public interest."1 9 1 The
respondents argued that Congress waived the executive's power to
withhold documents in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 19 2 It was in re-
sponse to these positions that the Court uttered the two words that
have so muddied the waters: "Both positions," stated the Court, have
"constitutional overtones."'u9  The Court then announced its "nar-
rower ground for decision. '194 From this we can presume that the
ground for the decision was ultimately free of constitutional over-
tones. 95 Therefore, although the Court was attempting to avoid a
holding with constitutional overtones, Reynolds tells us only that the
extreme positions-complete judicial abdication and no privilege at
all-have such overtones. Everything in between these options is fair
game.
United States v. Nixon gave more ammunition to those eager to
constitutionalize the privilege. The relevant passage 196 states: "[Presi-
dent Nixon] does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they
are military or state secrets. As to these areas of Art. II duties .... ,,197
190 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3rd. Cir. 1951), rev'd 345 U.S. 1
(1953). The dissenting justices in the Supreme Court decision simply adopted the Third
Circuit's opinion. 345 U.S. at 12.
191 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit at 10, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (No. 21).
192 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 (discussing respondents' argument).
193 Id. In a footnote, the Court elaborated on the government's argument that it has
"an inherent executive power which is protected in the constitutional system of separation
of power." Id. at n.9. Although the Court prefaced this remark with "[i]t is said," some
have mistakenly read the footnote as endorsing this argument. See, e.g., Halkin I, 598 F.2d
1, 14 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for re-
hearing en banc) ("In Reynolds the Court suggested that the privilege was rooted in the
separation of powers.").
194 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
195 See Weaver & Escontrias, supra note 2, at 59 ("The decision seems to involve com-
promise, not principle. It is about the nuts and bolts of judicial action, not the reach of
Article II powers."). To buttress their claim that Reynolds was not creating constitutional
doctrine, Weaver and Escontrias also note Reynolds's scant justification for its holding and
the fact that the Justices' private papers hardly mention the case. See id. at 57-58.
196 For a discussion of this passage, see supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
197 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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Note that the passage merely refers to military and state secrets as Arti-
cle II duties. This is not itself noteworthy. Nowhere does it suggest
that the executive's power to withhold from the judiciary these secrets
derives from Article II, let alone that Article II mandates a certain
amount ofjudicial deference. In fact, in Department of the Navy v. Egan,
after praising the executive branch's superior expertise on military-
and foreign affairs-related matters, the Court expressly de-constitu-
tionalized Nixon's dicta: "'As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts
have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential respon-
sibilities.' [citing Nixon]. Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs."' 9 8
If the Egan Court had believed that the Constitution mandates a cer-
tain degree of judicial deference, then it would not have suggested
that Congress has the authority to alter the deference standard.
Nixon's dicta is best read as explaining the contexts in which pru-
dence warrants judicial deference. After stating the standard, the
Nixon court cited to Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steam-
ship Corp. and included the following quotation from that case: "It
would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information,
should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on
information properly held secret."1 99 Chicago and Southern Air Lines
was not just referring to privileged information but also to the combi-
nation of the executive branch's regular access to intelligence reports
and the "delicate," "complex" and "prophe[tic]" nature of executive-
branch decision making.2 0 0 In other words, the Chicago and Southern
Air Lines court-and thus the Nixon court-was concerned that the
judiciary might not be qualified, due to differences in institutional
competency, to second-guess the executive branch's judgment on na-
tional security matters. Neither Nixon nor Chicago and Southern Air
Lines, however, implies that this rationale forjudicial deference is con-
stitutionally based.
Although the majority of courts have continued to refer to the
privilege as a "common law evidentiary rule,"2 0' after Nixon, courts in-
creasingly began discussing the state secrets privilege in "separation of
198 Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1988) (emphasis added).
199 Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); see Nixon, 418
U.S. at 710 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111).
200 See id.
201 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Zuckerbraun v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d. Cir. 1991); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474
(D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); Trulock v. Lee, 66 F. App'x 472, 475 (4th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998).
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powers themes."20 2 The pinnacle of this trend is the Fourth Circuit's
recent decision in el-Masri v. United States.20 3 The el-Masri court began
with the coy observation that the privilege "performs a function of
constitutional significance. '" 20 4 The court then turned to Nixon, find-
ing support for a constitutionally derived state secrets privilege in the
Nixon passage discussed above 20 5 and a second passage two paragraphs
after the first:
No case of the Court, however, has extended [the state secrets privi-
lege's] high degree of deference to a President's generalized inter-
est in confidentiality. Nowhere in the Constitution, as we have
noted earlier, is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confi-
dentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a
President's powers, it is constitutionally based.20 6
The el-Masri court, however, included only the italicized portion of the
quote.20 7 In context, the heavily qualified passage says no more than
this: if the lack of an evidentiary privilege would impede the Presi-
dent's fulfillment of his constitutional duties, then the privilege has
constitutional relevance. The el-Masri court ends the paragraph that it
began with a recognition of the privilege's "constitutional signifi-
cance" 208 by concluding that the "state secrets privilege ... has a firm
foundation in the Constitution. '" 209  This statement is without
precedent.
Firm foundation notwithstanding, the pertinent question is not
whether the Constitution mandates that some such privilege exists,
but whether it mandates some amount of judicial deference to the
executive branch in the exercise of that privilege. Neither el-Masri nor
Reynolds suggests that it does. The strongest support for this conten-
tion is in Nixon's utmost deference passage. However, Department of the
Navy v. Egan expressly states that utmost judicial deference is subject
to congressional override, and the Nixon court's reliance on Chicago
and Southern Air Lines's rationale for this deference appears to ground
deference in an institutional competency rationale.
d. Potential Conflict of Interest
Basing judicial deference to the executive branch on the execu-
tive branch's superior expertise on national security-related matters
presumes that the invoking official's judgment will always reflect that
202 See Chesney, supra note 23, at 1270-71.
203 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).
204 See id. at 303.
205 See supra text accompanying note 164.
206 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (emphasis added).
207 See el-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 304.
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expertise. Even if such a presumption is warranted, it is certainly not
without exception. The state secrets privilege is a convenient vehicle
through which an executive official can conceal misdeeds, 210 prevent
liability,21' or simply avoid public embarrassment. 212 As Louis Fisher
puts it in his book In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential
Power and the Reynolds Case: "Executive officers might be better quali-
fied to decide technical questions, but their work within an agency
and under the control of the White House invites bias and deception
when it comes to withholding and characterizing public docu-
ments. ' 213 Judge Bazelon, dissenting in the pivotal Halkin I, most fa-
mously stated the problem: " [T] he [state secrets] privilege becomes a
shield behind which the government may insulate unlawful behavior
from scrutiny and redress by citizens .... 214
One might find these potential conflicts of interest problematic
for two reasons. "First, when agencies violate the constitutional rights
of citizens and commit crimes, it is perverse and antithetical to the
rule of law that they may avoid judgment in court and exposure of
210 See Fuchs, supra note 15, at 153 ("A[n] ... incentive to keep secrets is that national
security secrecy ends public inquiry into allegations of misconduct ...."); Kadidal, supra
note 87 ("[F]ive decades of living with [the state secrets privilege] has shown that the
privilege is frequently invoked to cover up executive mistakes.").
211 The most poignant example is Reynolds itself. In a 2000 Freedom of Information
Act request, the children of the original plaintiffs discovered that the crash report did not
in fact contain any sensitive information. See FISHER, supra note 17, 165-211. Although the
government may have had multiple incentives to mischaracterize the crash report, William
Weaver and Danielle Escontrias suggest that its motive was "a fear of embarrassment and
liability for gross negligence in maintenance of the aircraft that crashed." See Weaver &
Escontrias, supra note 2, at 59. A 1982 Note in the Yale LawJournal sums up the dilemma
quite well: "Courts hesitate to probe executive decisions concerning international affairs
because of ... judicial recognition that the executive has superior skills for making those
policy judgments. In conflict with this reluctance is the need for judicial supervision of
evidentiary privileges to prevent their use as a shield against liability." Note, supra note 15,
at 578-79; see also Fuchs, supra note 15, at 153 (arguing that the desire to avoid government
liability creates an incentive to invoke the privilege).
212 Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold acknowledged that "[iut quickly becomes
apparent to any person who has considerable experience with classified material that there
is massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with
national security, but with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another." Erwin N.
Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classified Information, WASH. POST, Feb.
15, 1989, at A25; see also Askin, supra note 15, at 761-62; Gardner, supra note 15, at 586-87;
Kadidal, supra note 87 (arguing that the government invoked the state secrets privilege in
Edmonds to prevent airing the discharged employee's embarrassing complaint that the gov-
ernment was sending translators to the Guantanamo Bay detention facilities that did not
speak the language they were purportedly translating).
213 See FISHER, supra note 17, at 121; see also Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 101
("[I]f department heads or the president know that assertion of the privilege is tanta-
mount to conclusive on the judiciary, and that federal judges rarely order documents for
inspection, then there is great incentive on the part of the executive branch to misuse the
privilege.").
214 Halkin , 598 F.2d 1, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon,J., dissenting from the denial
of the petition for rehearing en banc).
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these activities to the public by refusing to disclose inculpatory infor-
mation."21 5 The lower courts have rejected the claim that this prob-
lem warrants an exception to the state secrets privilege. 216 If courts
rationalize the privilege on the ground that an individual's need for
the information is counterbalanced by the public's need for secur-
ity,2 ' 7 it makes little sense to create an exception to force the govern-
ment to account for its own wrongdoing. To do so, by hypothesis,
would be at the expense of public safety.
"Second, if the privilege protects the executive and agencies from
investigation and judicial power, then the incentive on the part of ad-
ministrators is to use the privilege to avoid embarrassment, to handi-
cap political enemies, and to prevent criminal investigation of
administrative action."218 At first glance, the rationale for rejecting
the first problem seems to apply to the second problem as well. How-
ever, the second problem should give one pause for an entirely differ-
ent reason: like the flea market owner in Situation C,219 the existence
of an ulterior motive makes one's judgment less trustworthy.2 20 Thus,
greater scrutiny might be appropriate not to force the government to
account for its wrongdoing but to ensure that there really is a national
security threat.
In state secrets privilege cases, reviewing judges surrender some
of their adjudicatory power to executive officials because of the lat-
ter's superior expertise. Consequently, the executive official is, poten-
tially, both an interested party and a judge. Because the state secrets
privilege makes the government's interest irrelevant, this creates a po-
tential conflict of interest. The government, like a reviewing judge
with a personal interest in a case, should respond by recusing itself as
judge when the conflict is actual and nontrivial. 22 1 In this context,
215 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 90.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
217 See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., 776 F.2d 1236, 1238 n.3 (4th Cir. 1985) ("When
the state secrets privilege is validly asserted, the result is unfairness to individual litigants-
through the loss of important evidence or dismissal of a case-in order to protect a greater
pubic value.").
218 See Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 15, at 90.
219 See supra p. 1245.
220 See Fuchs, supra note 15, at 156 ("If the government were an ordinary litigant, its
past practices might cause a court to consider secrecy claims with some level of skepticism.
At the very least, one would expect the courts to be sensitive to red flags raised in individ-
ual cases, including cases in which the government allegedly violates fundamental constitu-
tional principles, cases in which the government employs categorical secrecy claims instead
of an individualized assessment of the need for secrecy, cases involving allegations of gov-
ernment misconduct, cases in which the government targets minority segments of the pop-
ulation, cases that suggest a denial of informed citizen participation in government, and
the like.").
221 Because the issue is the amount of information the official gives the reviewing
judge, recusal can be a matter of degree.
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recusal means providing the judge with the information needed to
independently assess the privilege claim.
Although courts and commentators have cited deference ratio-
nales in addition to the three mentioned, 222 they tend to supplement,
rather than replace, those already addressed. Of the three rationales,
institutional competency is the one lower courts invoke most fre-
quently and that commentators regard most highly. Reynolds's con-
cern about the risk of exposure is a necessary backdrop to any policy
of withholding information, but it is not independently sufficient to
justify the lower courts' approaches to judicial deference. And al-
though abolishing the privilege altogether might offend the Constitu-
tion, no support exists for the claim that the Constitution mandates a
particular degree of deference. Institutional competency itself, how-
ever, is an uneasy foundation on which to rest a static deference stan-
dard. As Halkin I illustrates, the rationale is frequently invoked in a
particular factual context: when the link between disclosure and harm
is not obvious to ajudge or layperson. 223 Moreover, many state secrets
privilege cases present potential conflicts of interest for the invoking
executive official, thereby reducing the respect the official's superior
expertise would otherwise demand.
III
A PROPOSED ANAIYSIS 2 2 4
The ultimate question is how much information ajudge must re-
view before passing on a state secrets privilege claim. To answer this
question, one must understand two facets of the privilege: what condi-
tions must be present for the privilege to apply and to what extent a
judge should independently assess whether those conditions are met.
222 Additional rationales include fear of burdening the court, see Sterling v. Tenet, 416
F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting " ' the burdens in camera review places upon the dis-
trict courts'" (quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 571 (1989))), preserving insti-
tutional capital, see Stone, supra note 3, at 1316 ("If [judges] err in rejecting [the
executive's] judgments, judges may harm not only the national security but also the long-
term credibility of the judiciary itself."), and fear of "graymail": litigant's forcing the gov-
ernment to settle for high sums of money in order to safeguard national security, see Ster-
ling, 416 F.3d at 344 (reasoning that courts should be cautious so as to avoid presenting the
government with a "Hobson's choice between settling for inflated sums or jeopardizing
national security").
223 Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
224 This section describes the state secrets privilege in terms of variables and how the
relationships between them should guide a judge's analysis. One consequence of this
approach is that the section frequently uses mathematical terms, perhaps creating the false
impression that one could quantify these variables in a meaningful way. As a general




A. The Trigger Test
The following proposal arranges Reynolds's pieces into a more
precise and flexible trigger test.2 25 The trigger test is a function of
three variables: (1) the magnitude of threatened harm to the public;
(2) the likelihood that disclosing the information at issue will result in
that harm; and (3) the importance of the information to the case of
the party requesting it.
1. The Public's Interest226
Consistent with Reynolds, the proposed trigger test focuses on the
public's interest. Instead of relying upon the imprecise "reasonable
danger" and "national security" triggers, however, the proposed trig-
ger test measures the public's interest in terms of the likelihood and
magnitude of the potential harm. When invoking the state secrets
privilege, an executive official must state, in specific terms, the effect
that disclosure would have on the public's security and, if not the
same, the actual harm to the public that might result.22 7 As discussed
above, 228 the government's proffered harm is rarely actual harm to the
public. Rather, it is usually a proxy event that will, within a certain
degree of likelihood, lead to actual public harm. The problem is that
substituting such a proxy for actual harm entails an often-ignored
probability. The invoking official and judge should recognize both the
probability that an event will occur and the probability that the event
will actually harm the public.229 The product of those two probabili-
ties then tempers the actual magnitude of the final harm. 230
225 The Reynolds Court attempted to create a new doctrine that appeared to rest firmly
on an established foundation. But as William Weaver and Danielle Escontrias put it: "Al-
though the Court established a procedure for assertion of the privilege, that procedure is
not informed by larger principles of law. If the Court had plainly acknowledged that it was
starting from scratch concerning the privilege it may have exercised more care in how it
formulated its use and the role of courts in that process." Weaver & Escontrias, supra note
2, at 63. Taking Weaver and Escontrias's cue, this section might best be read as an attempt
to rework Reynolds from scratch.
226 To truly estimate the public's interest, the judge must balance the threat of harm
against the public's interest in government transparency. Because the benefit flowing from
government disclosure is relatively constant, however, it need not be a variable in the
analysis.
227 See A-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007)
("Simply saying 'military secret,' 'national security' or 'terrorist threat' or invoking an ethe-
real fear that disclosure will threaten our nation is insufficient to support the privilege.").
228 See supra Part II.B.1.
229 A judge should presume that the executive official has honestly characterized the
contents of all relevant documents. If a judge has reason to doubt the invoking official's
honesty, deference is inappropriate.
230 Of course, in theory there could be only one probability or there could be more
than two. For example, an executive official could argue only that disclosing particular
information might lead to the poisoning of a city's water system. In that example, the
reviewing judge should recognize only one probability. More often, however, the execu-
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If, for example, the concern is exposing the Central Intelligence
Agency's methods and capabilities, the executive official should ex-
plain to the court how disclosing such information would harm the
public. If the harm is great but the causal chain is indirect, the risk
may be low. 23 1 In contrast, if the requested document contains infor-
mation related to building a nuclear weapon, the harm is great and
the causal chain quite direct. Accordingly, the latter poses a greater
threat to public safety and the state secrets privilege should more
readily apply.
2. The Requesting Party's Interest
The trigger test measures the requesting party's interest by the
effect a successful invocation of the privilege would have on the
party's case. If the requesting party can still make a prima facie case
without the requested information, 23 2 the interest is low and, conse-
quently, a lower risk of harm to the public might nevertheless trigger
the privilege. If without the requested information the judge must
dismiss the case, 233 either the probability or magnitude of the harm
must be greater to trigger the privilege.
This balancing approach still preserves the spirit of the absolute
privilege. Past a threshold showing of probability and magnitude of
harm to the public, the privilege might apply regardless of the re-
questing party's showing of need. 23 4 In that case, this approach's prin-
tive official will find it convenient to outline steps between disclosure and harm. For exam-
ple, the official might argue that (a) a hostile organization might discover the disclosed
information; (b) the organization might have uncovered related information sometime in
the past, thereby putting it in a position to combine the information in a way that would
allow it to poison a city's water system; and (c) the organization might then have the means
and desire to actually poison the city's water system. In this example, the reviewing judge
should recognize three distinct probabilities: disclosure - (a); (a) -* (b); and (b) ---) (c).
The product of those three probabilities ought to be the same as the single probability in
the first example. However, if the official knows of additional information that might
make some of the intermediate inferences more likely, then explaining the intermediate
steps in the causal chain might convince the judge that the harm is more likely than the
judge would have otherwise estimated.
231 In this respect, so-called mosaic cases are actually disfavored in the state secrets
privilege analysis. One of the hallmarks of the mosaic theory is that information might be
combined in unforeseeable ways to cause unforeseeable harm to the public. Therefore,
unless the invoking official can show that, though specifically unforeseeable, the harm is
generally likely, mosaic cases are low-probability cases. SeeWeaver & Escontrias, supra note
2, at 71 & n.204 ("[T]he mosaic theory leads to bizarre results, often making courts look
foolish, with judges simply divesting themselves of oversight responsibility because of fre-
quently fanciful possibilities of damage to the national security .... In the author's opin-
ion, innocuous-looking material is usually just that and provides no aid to our enemies.").
232 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
233 For discussion of the circumstances under which dismissal is appropriate, see supra
text accompanying notes 112-117.
234 See Halkin 1, 598 F.2d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon,J., dissenting from the denial
of the petition for rehearing en banc) ("Even assuming that, in the extreme case, 'the most
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cipal break from the courts' current approach is that the trigger test
requires a lower likelihood and magnitude of harm when the request-
ing party's interest is trivial-a result the current approach is not flexi-
ble enough to accommodate. The precise weighting of these factors is
beyond the scope of this Note.
B. Judicial Review: The Deference Calculus
Ajudge's review of a state secrets privilege claim is only different
from the executive official's initial analysis if the judge defers, to some
extent, to the official's judgment. Deference in this context means
that ajudge can affirm an executive official's conclusion that the privi-
lege applies after considering only a subset of the information availa-
ble to the official. The principal rationale for this deference is the
belief that the executive branch is better equipped than the judicial
branch to apply the trigger test accurately. 235 That rationale alone,
however, does not necessarily warrant withholding pertinent informa-
tion from the reviewingjudge. Deference based on institutional com-
petency differences (competence deference) might mean no more
than that a judge who, after reviewing all the pertinent information,
disagrees with an executive official's judgment, nevertheless affirms
thatjudgment. This result would follow when the margin of disagree-
ment between the executive official and reviewing judge falls within
the margin of competence deference.
As an example, consider the flea-market hypothetical described
in the Introduction.2 36 There, the issue was whether the owner of the
flea market correctly priced the bookcase at $750. Unlike in the state
secrets privilege context, you, as the consumer, are free to study the
bookcase in as much detail as the owner who priced it. In Situation A,
the owner was an expert in the area and knew significantly more
about the value of such items. Accordingly, the margin of compe-
tence deference in that case would be substantial, perhaps $400.237
Therefore, if upon careful inspection you decide the value of the
bookcase is anywhere between $350 and $1150, you should assume
the bookcase is priced correctly. If you believe the bookcase is worth
only $300, you should not purchase it because the margin of disagree-
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege ....' (quoting Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 11)).
235 See supra text accompanying notes 179-80, 199-200.
236 See supra p. 1244.
237 A good example of a very high margin of competence deference is the scene in
Scent of a Woman in which the Chris O'Donnell character instructs the blind Al Pacino
character when to turn their racing Ferrari onto a side street. Scent of a Woman (Universal
Pictures 1992).
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ment ($450) is outside the margin of competence deference
($400) .238
But unlike in the flea market hypothetical, when the relevant in-
formation pertains to military and state secrets, disclosing information
has its costs, even disclosure to a judge.2 39 Accordingly, a reviewing
judge should not require in camera review when the judge places little
value on the withheld information. The value of the withheld infor-
mation is a function of the margin of competence deference. But the
relevant deference here is not simply competence deference. To
translate this back into the flea-market hypothetical, the issue in this
context is whether you should purchase the bookcase upon only mini-
mal inspection. The relevant margin of deference (scrutiny deference)
is the difference between the margin of competence deference and
the extent to which information available to the owner of the flea mar-
ket, but not available to you, would have increased your confidence in
your estimate of the bookcase's value (information asymmetry error).
The mental calculus required to make this determination can be ex-
pressed as follows:
Affirm if MD <M
MD = Margin of Disagreement
Ms= (Mc - C) - I
Ms = Margin of Scrutiny Deference
Mc = Margin of Competence Deference
C = Potential Conflict of Interest
I = Information Asymmetry Error
1. Information Asymmetry Error
The reviewing judge's first step is to apply the trigger test, de
novo, in light of the available information. The information available
to ajudge at this stage comes from two sources. The first source is the
government. The government usually provides information in the
form of an open affidavit, or classified affidavit or documents that the
judge will review in camera.2 4° The second type of sources include
those facts generally known or that may be inferred from the
circumstances. 24 1
After applying the trigger test, the judge should estimate the mar-
gin of information asymmetry error, which is the extent to which in-
formation available to the executive official but withheld from the
238 If you believe the bookcase is worth $1500 you should purchase it and assume you
got a great deal.
239 See supra Part II.B.4.a.
240 The in camera review at this stage involves only information submitted voluntarily to
thejudiciary. See generally Halkin I, 598 F.2d 1, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (approving the district
court's decision to consider two government affidavits, one public and one private).
241 See supra text accompanying notes 145, 147-51, 156.
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judge would have increased the judge's confidence in the test's out-
come. If, for example, the executive official voluntarily submitted all
the relevant documents for the judge's in camera review, the informa-
tion asymmetry error would be zero. This is true even if the judge has
little confidence in the test's outcome for other reasons. On the other
extreme, if the judge knows absolutely nothing about the privilege
claim, the information asymmetry error is infinite, regardless of the
judge's confidence in the invoking official. The more common scena-
rio is that the executive official will explain in general terms the con-
tent of the requested documents and their threat to public safety,
withholding the specific information and threat. 242 In such cases, the
information asymmetry error is the extent to which the withheld specif-
ics would aid the judge's analysis.
2. Margin of Competence Deference and Potential Conflict of Interest
The reviewing judge's second step is to determine the margin of
competence deference and the potential conflict of interest. The
margin of competence deference is the degree to which the executive
official is in a better position than the judge to evaluate the risk of
harm. That margin is then discounted by the requesting party's show-
ing that factors unrelated to public safety may have influenced the
official's judgment. Ajudge should presume that an executive official
possesses an expertise advantage over the judge on all national secur-
ity-related matters. The government and requesting party should
have the opportunity to overcome that presumption by showing that
in the particular case the institutional differences are greater 243 or less
than presumed.
A judge should also presume that the executive official is acting
solely in the public's interest and that therefore the official's judg-
ment fully reflects the official's expertise. The requesting party might
overcome this presumption by making a prima facie case that consid-
erations unrelated to public safety influenced the executive official's
242 Unfortunately, it is impossible to know the contents of the government's classified
affidavits that judges review in camera. One can only assume that the reason the govern-
ment prefers to submit a classified affidavit over the actual documents is that through the
former, one can describe the documents' contents generally without revealing any specific
information.
243 Mosaic cases-in which the relevance of the requested information might only be
apparent to an intelligence analyst-might fall into this category. The judge should also
be aware, however, that mosaic cases are generally low-probability cases. See supra Part
II.4.B. In that case, the judge should accord the executive official greater deference, but
the trigger test-which serves as both the executive official and judge's benchmark-will
be more difficult to satisfy. In the end, mosaic cases' unique characteristics may cancel
themselves out.
1280 [Vol. 93:1243
JUDGING WITHOUT THE FACTS
decision to invoke the privilege.244 Different motives may have a
greater or lesser influence on an official's judgment. Accordingly, a
judge may find that the prospect of ordinary liability, public embar-
rassment, or a high-profile constitutional violation discount the execu-
tive official's expertise by different degrees. Finally, the government
ought to have the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case against it.
Ideally, the prospect of greater judicial scrutiny will create an incen-
tive for the government to devise ways of assuaging the court and pub-
lic's concern that executive officials are invoking the state secrets
privilege on pretextual grounds.
3. Margin of Scrutiny Deference
In the final step, the judge should either affirm or deny the state
secrets privilege claim based on the amount of information available
and the margin of scrutiny deference. The margin of scrutiny defer-
ence is the difference between the margin of competence deference,
discounted for the potential conflict of interest, and the information
asymmetry error. If, after considering a subset of the relevant infor-
mation, the judge's own assessment of the trigger conditions is close
enough to the trigger test threshold to be within the margin of scru-
tiny deference (MD < MS), the judge should find that the privilege
applies without reviewing any additional information.
If, on the other hand, after assessing the trigger conditions, the
judge's conclusion that the privilege does not apply is outside the mar-
gin of scrutiny deference (MD > MS), the judge should continue to
request information until either (1) the judge's assessment falls within
the margin of scrutiny deference, in which case the judge should af-
firm the privilege's application, or (2) after reviewing all of the availa-
ble information, the judge's conclusion is still outside the margin of
scrutiny deference and therefore the judge should deny the privi-
lege's application. Ajudge should never reject a state secrets privilege
claim without reviewing all pertinent information, for one does not
defer to someone with whom one disagrees.
244 Cf McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1023 (Fed. Cir.
2003). In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiffs alleged that the government was invoking the
state secrets privilege to engage in fraud and deceit. Id. The court rejected this argument
as a reason to demand disclosure, reasoning that the plaintiffs had not presented any evi-
dence to support their allegations, nor had they cited any case in which the government
had misused the privilege. Id. McDonnell Douglas thus recognizes the issue but errs in how
it assigns the burden for proving that the government is improperly invoking the privilege.
A requesting party will never be able to make a full case for the pretext allegation when the
party does not have access to all the relevant information. In cases such as McDonnellDoug-
las, the court ought to shift the burden onto the government once the requesting party has




Let us return to the flea market. You see a bookcase priced at
$750; do you purchase it? First, you must identify the information
asymmetry error. Here, assume you can freely inspect the bookcase
but you do learn that the flea market owner, who priced the bookcase,
has documents detailing its age and ownership history. When you ask
the owner about the bookcase's age and history the owner responds
that it is quite old and has had only a small number of homes but that
you can't inspect the relevant documents for confidentiality reasons.
Although the withheld information-the specifics of the bookcase's
history-would aid you in your evaluation of it, its assistance would
not be substantial. You estimate the bookcase's value at $650 but ac-
knowledge that unknowns relating to the bookcase's history could
shift that estimate $50 in either direction. Therefore, the information
asymmetry error is $50.
Next, you must estimate the margin of competence deference
you owe the judgment of the flea market owner discounted for any
potential conflict of interest that the owner might have. The owner is
a well-known expert in the field. You, on the other hand, are a well-
informed antique consumer who even subscribes to an antique-re-
lated magazine. Therefore, you estimate that the owner's competency
advantage is worth a $200 deference margin. But you also learn that
the owner makes a sizable commission on each bookcase sold. Your
concern is that although the owner can estimate the bookcase's value
more accurately than you, the promise of a commission might lead
the owner to price it over its value. You conclude that the commission
probably induced the owner to price the bookcase about $100 over its
value. Therefore, the margin of competence deference decreases
from $200 to $100.
Finally, you must decide whether you should purchase the book-
case. Is $650 close enough in light of the information made available
to you? No. Had you estimated the bookcase's value at $650 after con-
sidering all the relevant documents, the margin of scrutiny deference
would be $100 and your estimate would be just inside that margin.
But your lack of information created a $50 information asymmetry
error that you must subtract from the $100 margin of competence
deference. The result is that you should not purchase the bookcase
unless your margin of disagreement is less than $50: that the bookcase
is worth at least $700. As is, your personal estimate is $100 less than
the listed price. Therefore, your margin of disagreement is outside
the margin of scrutiny deference.
Your response should not be to go home but to demand more
information. Analyzing even some of the withheld documents might
simultaneously increase your personal estimate of the bookcase's
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value from $650 to $675 and decrease your information asymmetry
error from $50 to $20. In that case, your margin of scrutiny deference
has increased from $50 to $80 and your margin of disagreement has
decreased from $100 to $75. Because the margin of disagreement is
now within the margin of scrutiny deference, you should purchase the
bookcase.
CONCLUSION
The state secrets privilege is a controversial doctrine of unknown
origin. It pits the executive branch's duty to protect the public against
the judiciary's duty to preserve the rule of law. The Supreme Court
has not directly addressed the relationship between the executive
branch and judiciary in this context. As a result, lower courts have
diverged, applying varying degrees of judicial deference based on un-
clear rationales. Some recent judicial applications of the privilege
have raised red flags and led commentators, if not courts, to reexam-
ine the doctrine. While many of these commentators have criticized
the courts for not sufficiently overseeing the privilege's application,
none have explored exactly why judicial deference is desirable in one
context but not in another.
This Note attempts to reconcile the state secrets privilege with an
intuitive understanding of deference. It reorganizes the pieces from
the Reynolds opinion to separate those that properly belong to the ini-
tial trigger test from those that are relevant to the judge's review of
that test. The Note then outlines a precise and flexible trigger test,
derived from Reynolds, as well as a general schematic that highlights
why some decisions warrant more judicial scrutiny than others. This
schematic is useful regardless of how much deference one believes is
appropriate on an absolute scale.
Important differences exist between the judiciary and executive
branch. Some differences, such as relative expertise, justify giving the
executive branch a more substantial adjudicative role in national se-
curity-related issues. Other differences, such as the executive
branch's far greater potential for conflicts of interest, should caution
otherwise. Yet it is precisely where these differences conflict-where
civil liberties and national security intersect-that the law provides
judges with the least guidance. Whether reviewing a state secrets privi-
lege claim or Freedom of Information Act request, judges should rec-
ognize their relative institutional weaknesses and strengths when
reviewing the executive branch's national security-related claims.
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